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Current Events in Ecuador: January, 2024

Methane-Flare-Joya-de-los-Sachas

A methane flare near Joya de Los Sachas in the Ecuadorian Amazon. If the historic referendum of August, 2023, is respected, the oil industry must cease its operations and remove infrastructure from the ITT block within a year.

By Marley Stuart

This report is dedicated to Fernando Alcibíades Villavicencio Valencia (1963-2023), who fearlessly fought corruption as an activist, journalist, lawmaker, and, finally, presidential candidate. In August, 2023, he was killed for his commitment to justice.

His legacy, however, will never die.


Guillermo Lasso

Guillermo Lasso, a conservative former banker, was elected president in April 2021. Initially Lasso had high approval ratings due to a robust COVID-19 vaccine rollout and promises to jumpstart the economy. In early August, he announced decrees 95 and 151—which sought to double oil and gas exploration in the Amazon, increase mining, and reduce environmental regulations. The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) immediately denounced these as unconstitutional and called for their repeal. In a press release delivered to the president and posted online, they outlined the ways extractive industries harm their communities and asked the State to respect their constitutional right to free, prior and informed consent before the start of new projects. They argued that these decrees would fast track development by side-stepping this process, and they offered a framework for guaranteeing the rights, which had been developed in a participative process in towns across the Amazon. In October, Leonidas Iza Salazar, President of CONAIE, filed a lawsuit of unconstitutionality against decree 95 in the Constitutional Court. 

In the months that followed, CONAIE and others repeatedly called for a forum with Lasso to discuss their concerns. They were ignored. They created a list of talking points (later, “demands”) outlining their most critical issues. These were signed not just by CONAIE but other Indigenous confederations representing separate nationalities and communities. CONAIE and these groups spent over half a year organizing among remote communities in the Amazon region. In June, an indefinite national strike was called: they would take to the streets in protest by blocking roads with felled trees, cars and burning tires.

In response to the strike, Lasso put military and police on the streets and granted them impunity in defending “law and order.” A special police detail, in an unmarked white pickup truck, captured Iza and illegally detained him for 48 hours. Protests erupted and confrontations between police and demonstrators turned violent. Among the civilians dead at the hands of police are Byron Guatataca and Henry Quezada Espinoza, who were both unarmed and engaged in peaceful protest when they were killed by police. A soldier, José Chimarro, was killed when military forces, to clear a road for a convoy of oil tankers, opened fire on Indigenous protestors in the Amazon community of Yamanunka, in Shushufindi. 

As the strike continued, along with further reports of human rights abuses, Lasso sought to reduce civil liberties by restricting access to the internet and cell service in provinces under the state of emergency order. He was forced to remove this clause from the decreeLa Casa de Cultura, a meeting place for organizers and protestors, was captured by police and illegally occupied on false pretense. Due to his handling of the strike, Lasso’s National Assembly voted to expel him from office. They narrowly failed. 

The strike ended with promises from Lasso on major points and a one-year moratorium on new extractive projects. Instead of boosting the economy by spurring industry, Lasso had ignored major sectors of the population, mishandled a national strike that devastated the economy, and ultimately made it illegal to develop new extractive projects.

Public sentiment never recovered. Lasso, without approval of his Assembly, was essentially unable to govern. In May, lawmakers in the assembly threatened impeachment once again, this time over charges of corruption. The assembly alleged Lasso had failed to end a faulty contract between a state-owned oil transport company and a private tanker company. Though signed before he took office, the contract was renegotiated during his presidency. Lawmakers alleged he failed to cancel the deal, while Lasso claimed he made changes on advice from Ecuador’s comptroller. Whatever the case, with threats of impeachment looming, Lasso invoked muerte cruzada (“mutual death”), a mechanism in the constitution that allows the president to dissolve the assembly if it no longer operates in the national interest. Lasso would henceforth govern by decree, or executive orders, and snap elections were called for August 20. 

Lasso chose not to run. The remainder of his term would be marked by growing security issues, escalations in violence, and reports of organized crime. At the end of his term, public referendums brought by grassroots organizers passed in a landmark victory for human and environmental rights. 

Rise in Crime

Ecuador has seen a shocking rise in organized crime in recent years. Multiple factors have led the country becoming a critical export site of cocaine and operations center for international cartels. A high volume of exports, mainly bananas, leave daily from its many pacific ports, which lack sophisticated scanning technology. It’s estimated that over two thirds of shipping containers leave the country without being searched. The country has relatively porous borders, especially in the Amazon region, where neighbors Colombia and Peru are the world’s largest cocaine producers. Additionally, the dollar economy makes money laundering here easier than in other countries in the region, and Ecuador lacks security forces with the experience or resources to target drug smuggling. Corruption is allegedly rampant among its police force and many elected officials. Furthermore, authorities have little to no control of the prison system, where local gangs hold power and have reportedly made connections with international drug-running groups. Prisoners easily obtain cell phones and contraband, apparently at the behest of corrupt guards.

Local and international investigations have found that Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel and its Jalisco Nueva Generación, along with Colombian cartels and various Albanian gangs (sometimes called the “Balkan Mafia”), operate in coordination with Ecuadorian gangs Los Lobos, Los Tiguerones, Los Choneros, and others, who are battling each other for control of the lucrative market. When police manage to make arrests and criminals are sentenced, they end up in the country’s chaotic prison system, often referred to as a “breeding ground” for gangs. When a prominent prisoner is moved in an attempt to curb his power, gangs respond with attacks within and outside of the prison system. When a gang leader is killed (such as the 2019 killing of Los Cubanos’ leader within a Guayaquil prison, or the 2020 killing of Los Choneros leader Jorge Luis Zambrano, aka “Rasquiña,” in Manta, after being released early from prison) the resulting power vacuum triggers turf wars by rival gangs and prison riots that have resulted in the violent death of dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of inmates.

Guards have been reported to stand outside of prison or cell walls during riots, although officials have sometimes been caught in the violence as well. During his presidency, Lasso called three separate states of emergency in the prison system in an attempt to stem the violence. In recent years, Ecuador’s murder rate has skyrocketed, in part due to the deaths that occur behind bars. 

Fernando Villavicencio

Villavicencio was a presidential candidate, running in the recent snap elections called by Lasso, who campaigned on a promise to end corruption and narcotrafficking. In the evening of August 9, 2023, he was shot leaving a campaign event in Quito, near Carolina park. 

Prior to his presidential bid, he was a political activist, investigative journalist, and an aide to assembly member Cléver Jimenez. Villavicencio was particularly outspoken during the Correa presidency, during which time he, with Jimenez, filed judicial complaints against high-ranking members of Correa’s cabinet, including the ex-president himself. Following the events of the 30th of September, 2010, (known as “30-S”)—when Correa took shelter in a hospital during a police revolt, claimed a coup d’ tat, and was evacuated by a military operation that killed 10 people, including civilians—Villavicencio called for Correa to be investigated for human rights abuses. Correa sued Villavicencio and Jimenez for defamation, and the reporter was sentenced to 18 months of prison and ordered to pay $47 thousand in damages to the president. The sentence was appealed, and Villavicencio continued his pressure on Correa’s government. In 2013, he published a report that exposed a possible conflict of interest between the Ecuadorian government and Chevron. Correa’s government claimed Villavicencio had hacked the president’s computer and disseminated confidential information, and Villavicencio’s home was raided and computers seized. Under increasing pressure from the president, and after a judge ordered his arrest in 2014, Villavicencio fled to the Ecuadorian Amazon and continued reporting while on the run. He eventually sought asylum in Peru, where he continued reporting from Lima.

Villavicencio later returned to Ecuador and was elected a national assembly member as Correa’s presidency ended. In 2018, a judge declared him innocent of all charges. After Lasso dissolved the assembly, Villavicencio declared his candidacy for president. If elected, he vowed to root out corrupt security officials and others who allowed criminal gangs to traffic cocaine through the country. During his campaign, Villavicencio reported numerous threats against his life, including from Los Choneros gang and its leader, Adolfo Macías or “Fito,” whom Villavicencio claimed was linked to the Sinaloa cartel. Despite these threats, Villavicencio did not wear a bulletproof vest, claiming the people were his protection. 

Following the killing of Villavicencio, six Colombian nationals with alleged ties to organized crime were arrested. They would later be found dead in prison. 

Villavicencio’s killing was the first assassination of a presidential candidate in Ecuador’s history. It was also just the latest in a string of violent attacks on public officials who spoke out against corruption. Fewer than 3 weeks earlier, on July 23, the mayor of Manta, Agustín Intriago, was killed by gunmen as he toured the coastal city. On February 4, Omar Menéndez, a mayoral candidate in the city of Puerto Lopez, was shot just before the polls opened. News of the attack reached voters who elected him mayor, although they knew he had died. On January 21, mayoral candidate of Salinas, Julio César Farachio, was also killed. 

In Villavicencio’s final speech, he said that he was a happy man. The happiness that matters, he exclaimed, is that which comes from deep pain. He continued, “The happiness that survives and becomes collective is that which is born from pain, struggle and sacrifice. Today I am a victorious being, I have won great battles against the mafias that plague this country.”

Moments later, the shots rang out. His death triggered confrontations between security forces and a gang leader, along with further escalations of violence and intimidation tactics. 

Power game

Lasso responded to Villavicencio’s killing by attempting to limit the power of the imprisoned leader of Los Choneros. On August 12, a heavily-armed police unit of 3,700 troops raided the medium security prison where Macías was held. They recovered firearms, ammunition, whiskey, and marijuana, and the gang leader was moved to a maximum security facility (nicknamed “La Roca”) in the same detention complex. The raid was videoed by authorities, and Macías is shown without his shirt, led by police at gunpoint, and in other images facedown with his hands behind his back along with other inmates. This was a vulnerable image of a man many believed untouchable. 

It didn’t last long. Macias’ lawyers appealed that their client’s life was in danger petitioned judge Diego Pomas to return Macías to his favored prison. Unbelievably, the request was granted and Macías returned, a little under a month after he had been moved. The justice system has vowed to appeal the ruling. 

On August 30 and 31, four carbombs and three explosive devices were detonated across the country in another unprecedented rise in violence. Within the same two days, 57 prison guards were taken hostage by prisoners inside 6 different prisons across the country. The hostages were released without harm, and nobody was injured in the explosions, which happened late at night. Two of the carbombs, in Quito, were located in front of current and former administrative offices of the corrections system.

A few days later, a music video was posted on Youtube that was filmed in part within the Guayaquil detention complex. The video, titled “El Corrido de León” (the Lion’s ballad), shows Macías inside the prison courtyard. He is wearing fine clothes and diamond-studded gold jewelry, calmly reading a book. In other shots he is stroking a fighting rooster and meeting with fellow prisoners. The video cuts between images of Macías to shots of his daughter, a musician who goes by the name Queen Michelle, and two men in a bar who sing about Macías’ honor. 

“He is the boss of bosses,” one of the lyrics goes. “For him, I take off my hat,” sings his daughter. She then flashes the sign of a gun.

In early January, 2024, there was an attempt to move Macías and other high profile inmates back to “La Roca.” In a contraband sweep of the medium-security prison, Macías could not be located. It seemed he had escaped. The implication is that the news of his transfer was somehow leaked, from the highest level of government, allowing him to break out before the transfer. Who leaked the information? Who aided his escape? It’s hard to imagine that this could have occurred without the help of guards. How far up the chain does this corruption go?

Rafael Correa

Former president Rafael Correa, a leftist economist who held office from 2007 to 2017, is seen by many to have inflamed security issues and led the country to its current precarious situation. His ten-year presidency was plagued with corruption allegations and international investigations. Repercussions are still being felt today, and actions taken during his presidency are seen to have weakened Ecuadorian security institutions and international relations.

Early in his ten-year presidency, Correa expelled the U.S. military from its base in the port city of Manta, where it worked to provide assistance on drug trafficking, and stopped coordinating with the U.S. State Department on narcotics control. After a Colombian operation killed a leader of the FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) within Ecuadorian territory, Correa alleged that the Manta base was used by the U.S. to support the Colombian operation (charges the U.S. military denied). Correa was obsessed with the notion that the U.S. presence in Ecuador threatened the country’s sovereignty. But subsequent investigations pointed to possible connections between Correa and the FARC. An investigation by the International Institute for Strategic Studies later showed, using data recovered from the FARC camp in Ecuador, that Correa accepted over $100,000 from the FARC for his presidential campaign of 2006, charges that the former president denied. 

Correa has been living in his wife’s native Belgium since January, 2018. Since then, many further allegations have been issued against the former president. In 2018, he was accused of orchestrating the kidnapping of an opposition lawmaker in 2012 and ordered to return to Ecuador to stand trial. Correa refused, having already requested asylum in Belgium, and a warrant was issued for ex-president’s arrest; if found guilty he could face 12 years in prison. Then, in April of 2020, as part of a separate investigation, an Ecuadorian judge found Correa guilty of corruption and sentenced him in absentia to eight years in prison. He was banned from running for office for 25 years and ordered to pay a fine of $14.7 million. These charges center on his 2013 reelection campaign, in which Correa and his officials are accused of accepting over $7 million in bribes from state businesses in return for favorable contracts. Over a dozen other governmental officials were found guilty, including Correa’s former vice president Jorge Glas, who was already serving time for a separate corruption charge two years earlier. 

Correa maintains an air of indignation and denies all charges, claiming he is a victim of political persecution. In April 2022, soon after an Ecuadorian judge signed yet another extradition order, Correa was granted political asylum by the federal government of Belgium—proof, he claims, of his unjust persecution.

In the election called when Lasso dissolved the assembly, Correa saw a chance to return to Ecuador in the campaign of Luisa Gonzales. Gonzales, a lawmaker and former lawyer, who held prominent positions in Correa’s presidency, announced that she would name the former president her chief advisor. 

In early October, republican lawmakers in the U.S. issued a letter to Biden urging him to hold Correa accountable for his crimes. In preparation, perhaps, of his return to politics?

Daniel Noboa

In the weeks after Villavicencio’s killing, presidential elections were held with the slain candidate’s name still on the ballots. No candidate won enough votes to take the presidency. Luisa Gonzales and Daniel Noboa—both assembly members discharged when Lasso dissolved the assembly—advanced to the runoff election to be held October 15. 

Many Ecuadorians saw each candidate as problematic. On the right was 35-year old newcomer Daniel Noboa, scion to a banana empire and son of Álvaro Noboa, who is considered Ecuador’s richest man and who ran for president five times. Daniel Noboa recently earned several advanced degrees in the U.S. but has little experience governing. On the left was Gonzales, whose name became synonymous with Correa’s. Despite the horrific events leading to October 15, the runoff elections were held peacefully. Although he was relatively unknown in politics before the first round of elections, Noboa emerged victorious. In late November, he was named Ecuador’s youngest president. 

Noboa holds an undergraduate degree in Business Management from the NYU Stern School of Business, as well as three Masters Degrees from U.S. universities: the Kellogg School of Management (Business Administration, 2019), Harvard Kennedy School (Public Administration, 2020), and George Washington University (Political Science, 2022). He entered politics as an assembly member in 2021 and served as chair of the Economic Development Commission until Lasso dissolved the national assembly. He is often described as center-right, though has described himself as center-left. His running mate, now vice president Verónica Abad, is more firmly on the right and has voiced support for privatization of the healthcare and education systems (public institutions in Ecuador).

Noboa faces imposing challenges. In the face of rising crime, weak security forces, little prospects for the country’s youth, rampant corruption, and severe economic issues, he will only hold office for only one and a half years. Given that he was elected as an outcome of the muerte cruzada mechanism, he will serve out the rest of Lasso’s term, which would have normally ended in May 2025. On the campaign trail, he was criticized as improvising when it came to security issues. His answer to the chaotic prison system is to repurpose barges as offshore prisons for the country’s most dangerous inmates. He vowed to fight the violence, corruption as well as target cocaine smuggling directly as a campaign for for Un nuevo Ecuador. But his actual policies remained unclear. Many see him as lacking the experience required to govern a nation.

His experience may well stand in his way, should he become embroiled in controversy. He is set to inherit the wealth of Noboa Corporation, estimated at over $300 million. Noboa, and his father, have been accused of tax evasion and in 2013 Ecuador’s IRS seized a plantation of 13,000 hectares, the largest in Ecuador, from Noboa Corp. to recover $100 million in unpaid taxes. It’s difficult to see how the young president, who maintains a position as Commercial Director of Noboa Corp., could avoid conflict of interest issues. While an assembly member, and shortly after the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine, he created the Inter Parliamentary Friendship Group between Russia and Ecuador and personally financed a trip for legislators to visit Russia—a major client for Noboa Corporation’s exports. Noboa, like Lasso, is tied to tax havens and appeared in the Panama papers. Noboa has never been charged for tax evasion.

A sad picture emerges when one compares the slain candidate Villavicencio, who started a newspaper at age 18 and tirelessly fought corruption as reporter, activist and lawmaker, with Noboa, who at 18 started an entertainment company that coordinates concerts and now rakes in $5 million a year. But it’s the picture we have. 

And yet. He did seem to galvanize the youth. In the days leading up to the runoff, “cardboard Noboas” went viral as young Ecuadorians posted selfies with life-size cutouts of Noboa across the country. His wife, Lavinia Valbonesi, is an entrepreneur, fitness and nutrition guru, and online influencer. She has hundreds of thousands of followers on Instagram and Tiktok and her online presence has been credited with boosting his popularity and spreading his call for un Nuevo Ecuador. If Noboa represents an unconventional choice in some ways, and a controversial one in others, that he can rally the youth should not be taken for granted. And in his first weeks as president-elect, more details on his proposed policies became clear and he began to show that he could make connections, internationally and domestically, that may help him overcome the challenges of Ecuador today. 

Days after being announced president elect, he traveled to Spain, Italy, and then the U.S. on a three-week tour to shore up international support for fighting organized crime and attracting outside investments to boost the economy. President Macron of France and officials in Italy pledged to support Ecuador on security issues. He met with the King of Spain and spoke to the president on the phone. It’s also expected that he will attempt to secure a Schengen visa extension for Ecuadorians, which they lack but which citizens of neighboring countries possess.

In the U.S., he met with representatives of the IMF and similar international finance institutions, including the management of J.P. Morgan and Barclays. Noboa secured $17.7 million dollars from USAID for fighting organized crime, and USAID’s director Samantha Power recently made a trip to Quito. It’s expected that Noboa will prioritize support for migrants fleeing Ecuador—he named this as his vice president’s agenda—and seek Temporary Protected Status for migrants entering the U.S. from Ecuador, which would grant them one year to work while they formalize their immigration papers. Vice president Abad has said that she would like to invest in Ecuador by claiming a portion of the taxes Ecuadorian migrants pay abroad. 

Noboa signaled that he will hold a referendum on the use of armed forces to combat organized crimes and delinquency. Additionally, he has said that he will announce an urgent tax reform, though he promised not to raise taxes. He plans to lower the sales tax or IVA on construction materials from 12% to 5% to boost infrastructure and development. In October and November, he began filling his cabinet, prioritizing economic positions, and promising an equal number of women and men. While he has chosen some veteran lawmakers, many of his choices are entrepreneurs in their 30’s without political backgrounds. The youngest is 26 years old. 

On November 17, the National Assembly held its first session since Lasso dissolved it in May. In his first success as president elect, Noboa proved that he is able to unite legislators with different backgrounds. His National Democratic Action party and Correa’s Social Christian Party formed a liberal legislative majority. Noboa recognizes he will need the approval of Correa’s supporters if he is expected to govern. Members of his political party managed to secure four seats in each of the two finance committees, a hopeful sign that he will be able to pass his urgent economic proposals. 

In early January, responding to Macías’ escape, Noboa signed an executive order that put military on the streets and called for a state of emergency. The following day, delinquents stormed a TV station in Guayaquil during a live broadcast and demanded that the government stop persecuting the cartels. Those involved in the TV station stunt were promptly arrested. Noboa signed an additional decree, declaring an “internal armed conflict” between military forces and armed gangs. The event made international headlines and inspired fear and anxiety among Ecuadorians, who were told to work from home. Schools would be held virtually. As military forces poured into urban areas, Noboa was handed his first true test—a dire security situation that will test not only the young president but all of Ecuador. 

“Yes” for Nature: Sí al Yasuní / El Chocó sin Minería 

Two public referendums passed in the August 20th elections—one in Quito to prohibit mining in the Chocó Andino, and the other, country-wide, to prohibit oil extraction in an area of Yasuní National Park in the Ecuadorian Amazon. The mountains of the Chocó hold precious metals such as copper and gold. The Amazon sits atop massive reserves of heavy crude oil. Each region has been threatened by extractive industries—both sanctioned and illegal projects—for decades. 

The Ecuadorian constitution of 2008 (the nation’s 20th) allows for public referendums to be brought to the polls. If decided by public majority, the referendum must be adopted immediately as an amendment to the constitution and enforced as such. This is a level of direct democracy not enjoyed by citizens of the U.S. A referendum may be initiated by the President, the National Assembly, or by a citizens’ initiative. If the latter, a significant number of signatures must be gathered and approved and still the referendum faces scrutiny. If brought by a president, referendums have been used by voters to show their support or disapproval, despite the issues involved. Referendums brought by citizens are exceptional, the result of grassroots organizing in communities through a process designed to ensure that they reflect the issues closest to the people.  

The Chocó Andino is a critical ecosystem for the vulnerable Andean bear and other threatened species, a biodiversity hotspot and site of endemism, especially for insects and birds, and a major source of Quito’s drinking water. The forests here are severely threatened by mining and deforestation, and they represent a mere remnant of the montane cloud forests in the Chocó region that spans from Panama to Colombia and Northwestern Ecuador. Grassroots organizers can be credited with bringing this issue close to home for Quiteños, showing how the region provides ecosystem services the capital relies on. The successful “Quito Sin Minería” campaign presented the Chocó as part of Quito, imparting a sense of pride in the region and warning of the damages mining could bring. 

The Yasuní referendum was over a decade in the making and an outcome of Correa’s failed Yasuní-ITT initiative. Part of the Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini block lies within the boundary of Yasuní National Park, an internationally recognized biodiversity hotspot. Two of the world’s last Indigenous groups living in voluntary isolation call this forest their home. Correa’s ITT initiative, which he adopted from a citizens’ movement, would have restricted drilling here if international investors paid half the expected revenue, or $3.6 billion. This was widely heralded as a groundbreaking environmental and social support mechanism. In 2013, after $330 million was invested in the initiative, Correa dropped the project and announced the auction of three million hectares of the Amazon basin for oil extraction. He is alleged to have planned their sale from the beginning. Drilling in ITT began in 2016. Other projects within Yasuní have operated for decades. 

Correa’s actions prompted grassroots organizers to draft the referendum to halt drilling in ITT. Their movement faced prominent opposition for ten years before making it to the polls. 

Their passage was celebrated as an immense victory. The people had spoken, and triumphed, in the face of an industry that seeks to prioritize profits over people and the planet. 

The path forward is anything but simple. The referendum against oil drilling in the Amazon—specifically block 41, part of which lies within Yasuní—says that all operations must cease and the infrastructure deconstructed within a year. That timeline has been criticized as impossible by outgoing Lasso and newly elected Noboa, along with major sectors of the population. Additionally, while this referendum passed across the country, it did not pass in every province. In fact, the referendum failed in the provinces most affected by the devastation of the industry. This has been used by detractors to criticize the referendum: if the people of the region nearest to the industry want drilling to continue, why should outsiders determine what’s best for them? The oil industry creates and manages social service programs for the families of workers and local people. A meager gesture to the immense devastation it wreaks on their lives through environmental damages. There are other bodies—the State, private, and nongovernmental organizations—more qualified to provide social services. And there are clear ethical issues to such a harmful industry being responsible for the welfare of the region’s people. Still, who will continue such programs if the “yes” vote is enforced? And what would be the consequences of their termination?

Another referendum could be held to overturn the “yes” vote. Should crime continue on its frightening path, or prices of fuel and basic goods rise, or jobs cease, the same people who voted against drilling may well vote to continue it.

Can Ecuador afford to lose the revenue these wells produce? How many jobs will be lost, and who will create the jobs to replace them? 

What about “leakage”—the process by which industry outlawed in one area simply moves to another? Will other protected forests be damaged by the outcome of the “yes” vote? 

What about Noboa? Will the newly elected president, who faces such a short term and incredible challenges, seek to enforce the “yes” vote? Failure to listen to the concerns of the vocal and mobilized Indigenous confederations will result in mass protest and economic damages. But by taking up the Yasuní issue, and starting to unravel the tangled threads of power and influence, Noboa will likely only cause further problems. The young president needs to show Ecuadorians that he can make progress on critical security issues before he faces another election. 

Facing these difficulties, it seems most likely the issue will be punted over claims of complexity and timelines concerns. Convincing arguments—economically, socially, if not environmentally—can be made for a slower phase-out. But supporters fear any lack in momentum now will only allow the referendum to be undone or ignored forever.  

Who is hurt most by the start of such an industry? And who is hurt most by its removal? In this case, the same people: local residents who depend on the jobs and social services of an industry that actively poisons the land. The benefits—mainly economic—to residents are disproportionate to the environmental harm wreaked here and to the profits accumulated by the wells’ owners and shareholders. The revenue is exported, the product is exported, and what remains in the communities themselves are disease and environmental degradation. The appetite of the world’s most comfortable continues to impoverish those with less. 

This is an atrocity of imbalance. One more reason that the significance of these the referendums should not be minimized. They are examples of successful grassroots organizing and direct democracy in the face of extreme opposition. They are signs that the majority of voters in Ecuador prioritize human rights and nature’s rights over corporation’s rights—despite the fact that the economy of the country depends on resource extraction. If the outcome is complicated, these referendums still give teeth to the constitutionally enshrined rights of nature and show the rest of the world a pathway for building a more sustainable world. They are a reminder that that power lies always in the people. 

If Ecuadorians are willing to demand the respect of socio-environmental rights, what is the proper response of people elsewhere? 

Despite rising crime, the people of Ecuador still showed up at the polls, and they voted for justice. In that, the people of Ecuador have shown that they themselves are the leaders this country, and our world, deserves.  

Also worth noting:

Debt for Nature 

In May, 2023, Guillermo Lasso secured for Ecuador history’s largest “debt for nature swap” to reduce the nation’s debt and secure conservation funding for the Galápagos. This model, which has been around since the 80’s on a much smaller scale, could serve as an example to other financially impoverished but biodiversity-rich nations. 

Decree 754 

Shortly after dissolving the national assembly, Lasso signed decree 754, which addresses the environmental consultation process that happens before a development project. Critics say it allows developers to avoid the informed consultation required by the constitution; advocates say it addresses the fact that no laws exist to enforce proper consultation. On November 17, the constitutional court ruled the decree unconstitutional and called on the assembly to create a law to address the matter. However, the ruling allows the decree to stay in effect until a law is created, though it cannot affect projects in Indigenous territory. 

Other Regional Developments

Amazon summit 

In August, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) met in Bélem, Brazil, in a summit on ending the destruction of the Amazon rainforest. Member countries are those whose territory shares the Amazon basin and rainforest: Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Guayana, and Suriname.

Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, previously held office from 2003 to 2010 as a champion of human rights through successful social welfare programs and environmental policies that curbed deforestation. Lula is back as president after defeating Jair Bolsonaro. Deforestation of the Amazon soared under Bolsonaro’s reign. Lula is promising further environmental protections. Colombia’s president, Gustavo Petro, is vowing no new petroleum exploration in Colombia and pressuring other countries of the 8-member group to do the same. 

The outcome of the summit was the Bélem Declaration, which calls for wealthy nations to help developing countries in the Amazon region to protect the forest. It advocates for debt relief in exchange for climate action, among other measures. It’s a multilateral proposition, which would see wealthy, developed nations paying to help protect the forests of the Amazon basin. 

It also calls for more regular meetings of the ACTO and seeks to strengthen connections among these countries, to create connections between the ACTO and other developing countries with tropical forests and with developed nations around the world. 

The Amazon Cooperation Treaty was signed on July 3, 1978 and led to the Amazon ACTO’s creation in 1995. A meeting hadn’t been held in 14 years. 

Marco temporal 

Marco Temporal (“time limit”) was a bill passed by the congress of Brazil during Bolsonaro’s presidency that would have limited Indigenous rights to their land and open the way for extractive industries and agriculture to move in without free, prior and informed consent. While Indigenous peoples of Brazil have the right to their land under the constitution, Marco Temporal stated that they must prove they possessed the land at the time the constitution was ratified in 1988. Ignoring centuries of dispossession, this was essentially a land-grab attempt by the Brazilian government and a result of Bolsonaro’s presidency emboldening racism in the legislature in Brazil. It was defeated in the supreme court of Brazil on September 21 of this year; however, the senate swiftly passed another bill with similar terms. In October, Lula partially vetoed this bill, allowing key parts to remain, though congress could overturn his veto. 

Sources

I am indebted to the journalists who have covered these issues extensively in national and international outlets. The sources included below are listed in no particular order.

  • https://dialogochino.net/en/extractive-industries/377246-ecuadors-oil-referendum-polarises-indigenous-groups/
  • https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20230624-el-petróleo-la-discordia-entre-ind%C3%ADgenas-amazónicos-de-ecuador
  • https://www.ioes.ucla.edu/project/research-in-the-choco-rainforest/
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